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Confidence Assessment Framework for Safety
Arguments
Rui Wang, Jérémie Guiochet, and Gilles Motet
LAAS-CNRS, Université de Toulouse, CNRS, INSA,UPS, Toulouse, France
Abstract. Confidence in safety critical systems is often justified by
safety arguments. The excessive complexity of systems nowadays intro-
duces more uncertainties for the arguments reviewing. This paper pro-
poses a framework to support the argumentation assessment based on
experts’ decision and confidence in the decision for the lowest level claims
of the arguments. Expert opinion is extracted and converted in a quanti-
tative model based on Dempster-Shafer theory. Several types of argument
and associated formulas are proposed. A preliminary validation of this
framework is realized through a survey for safety experts.
Keywords: safety argument, confidence assessment, belief function theory
1 Introduction
Safety case is an important representative of structured arguments adopted for
critical systems. It is used to formally present that a system is free from unac-
ceptable risks. This justification often demonstrates the compliance of the sys-
tem with safety regulation and includes a great amount of convincing evidence in
parallel. Both developers of critical systems and regulation bodies have to spend
time on evaluating such argumentation in order to produce trustful systems or
make a justified decision for certification. Many works have been done to help
this evaluation process. 1) Building a clear safety argument with a graphical
representation of safety arguments ([15, 6]); 2) Adding confidence arguments to
justify the confidence in safety arguments ([2, 12]); 3) Assessing the confidence
in arguments with quantitative methods ([7, 8, 11]).
This paper focuses on the third perspective. A confidence assessment frame-
work with specific steps based on Dempster-Shafer theory is proposed to fa-
cilitate the argumentation assessment process. It requires the safety experts’
opinions only on the lowest level claims of safety arguments. Then, the pro-
posed framework aggregates these opinions in a quantitative way to deduce the
decision and the confidence in this decision for the top goal of the safety argu-
ment. We made a first experiment through a survey among safety experts and
a preliminary validation of this framework is obtained.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, the background on GSN and
belief function theory is provided. In Section 3, the overview of the proposed
safety argument assessment framework is given. Two argument types with quan-
titative confidence aggregation models are introduced. Afterwards, in Section 4,
expert data collection is realized through a survey. We present the survey im-
plementation; then its responses are analyzed. In Section 5 the related works
are introduced. Finally, the contributions of our approach are summarized and
future works are highlighted in Section 6.
2 Background
2.1 Safety Argumentation
Structuring an argument to convince regulation bodies is a main challenge for
critical systems. Many approaches, such as safety case [16, 4], assurance case
[13], trust case [6], and dependability case [5], provide concepts and notations
for taking up this challenge.
Safety cases, a popular form of safety argumentation, could be defined as
[4] “a documented body of evidence that provides a convincing and valid ar-
gument that a system is adequately safe for a given application in a given en-
vironment”. A graphical argumentation notation, named as Goal Structuring
Notation (GSN), has been developed [15] to represent the different elements of
an assurance case and their relationships with individual notations. GSN allows
the representation of the supporting evidence, objectives to be achieved, safety
argument, context, etc. An example of GSN is given in Figure 1, which is de-
rived from the Hazard Avoidance Pattern [16]. The five main elements of GSN
presented in this figure are: goal (e.g., G1): the claim about the system; solution
(e.g., Sn1): the reference to evidence item(s); strategy (e.g., S1): the nature of
inference that exists between a goal and its supporting sub-goal(s); context (e.g.,
C1): a reference to contextual information, or a statement.
C1
 List of identified 
hazards for {System X}
G1
 {System X} is 
acceptably safe 
G3
 {Hazard H2} has been 
addressed
…
Gn
 {Hazard Hn} has been 
addressed
{Hazard H1} has 
been removed.
Sn1  
A given 
prevention risk 
control is 
implemented.
Sn2  
A given 
protection risk 
control is 
implemented.
Sn3
 {Hazard H1} has been 
addressed
G2
S1
 Argumentation by claiming 
addressed all identified 
plausible hazards 
Fig. 1. GSN example adapted from Hazard Avoidance Pattern [16]
2.2 Dempster-Shafer Theory
Among uncertainty theories (such as probabilistic approaches, possibility theory,
fuzzy set, etc.), Dempster-Shafer (D-S) Theory or evidence theory, was developed
by Arthur Dempster and Glenn Shafer successively [18]. This theory offers a
powerful tool to model human belief in evidence from different sources, and
an explicit modeling of epistemic uncertainties, which is not the case in other
theories. As presented later, we propose to use the D-S Theory as it allows
uncertainty, imprecision or ignorance, i.e., “we know that we don’t know” to be
explicitly expressed.
Let X be a variable taking values in a finite set Ω representing a frame of
discernment.Ω is composed of all the possible situations of interest. In this paper,
we consider only binary frame of discernment, i.e. ΩX = {X̄,X}. For instance,
if X would be the state of a bulb, then Ω = {on, off}. The mass function on
Ω (mΩ) is the mapping of the power set of Ω on the closed interval [0,1] that
is, 2Ω → [0, 1]. The mass mΩ(P ) reflects the degree of belief committed to the
hypothesis that the truth lies in P . The sum of the masses of all elements in the
power set is equal to one. For instance, we can have the following assignment
of belief: m1({on}) = 0.5, m1({off}) = 0.3, m1({on, off}) = 0.2. Note that
m1({on, off}) does not represent the belief that the bulb might be in {on} or
{off} state, but the degree of belief in the statement “we don’t know”.
More generally, an opinion about a statement X is assessed with 3 masses:
belief (belX = m(X)), disbelief (disbX = m(X̄)), and the uncertainty (uncerX =
m(Ω)). This leads to m(X)+m(X̄)+m(Ω) = 1 (belief + disbelief + uncertainty
= 1 ). Thus we have:



belX = m(X) represents the belief
disbX = m(X̄) represents the disbelief
uncerX = m(Ω) = 1− belX − disbX represents the uncertainty
(1)
where belX , disbX and uncerX ∈ [0, 1].
3 Safety Argument Assessment Framework
In this section, we introduce an assessment framework for safety arguments,
which allows 1) experts to provide their opinions on the lowest level claims
of a structured safety argument based on available evidence (e.g. test reports,
verification reports, etc.); and 2) to aggregate these opinions hierarchically until
we obtain the opinion of the top claim of the argument. The opinion aggregation
adopts a quantitative assessment method of argument confidence proposed in
our previous works [19]. A new formula to calculate the degree of disbelief and
uncertainty is provided in this paper.
3.1 Framework Overview
The proposed assessment framework of safety argument is summarized in Fig-
ure 2 with an argument showing that Goal B and Goal C support Goal A. This
schema also illustrates the three main steps:
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Fig. 2. Schema of the assessment framework for safety argument
i Transforming safety experts’ opinions of a goal of a structured argument into
a 3-tuple (bel,uncer,disb) representing Belief, Uncertainty and Disbelief in
this goal. In Figure 2, the process for B and C starts from using a scaled
evaluation matrix and then an uncertainty triangle named Jøsang triangle
[14]. We refer to the transformation expression between decision/confidence
and belief functions proposed in paper [7]. The experts’ opinion is presented
in two dimensions: decision and confidence in this decision. Instead of the
original proposal with belief function and plausibility function, we convert the
opinion directly into (bel,uncer,disb), to make explicit the formal concepts.
ii Aggregating all the 3-tuple estimation of lower-level claims into the upper-
level claim. This step is based on the confidence assessment method derived
from the D-S Theory [19]. As shown in Figure 2, the Belief, Uncertainty and
Disbelief of B and C are aggregated to produce the three values of A. This
aggregation requires some basic information on the argument, such as: the
argument types, the weights of B and C, etc.
iii The last step presents the inverse process of Step 1, which aims to generate
the opinion on A, i.e. the decision on A and the confidence in this decision.
This approach is detailed in Section 3.2 and 3.3. In Section 3.4, an application
to an argument example helps for a better understanding of this assessment
framework for safety argument.
3.2 Argument Types and Assessment
Like most of structured arguments, a GSN argument has a tree structure, which
is composed of a top goal and branches of sub-goals. As described in [12], the
assessment of the confidence in the top goal may be based on the estimation of
the trustworthiness of each sub-goal and the appropriateness of the sub-goals
in regard to the top goal. Thus, we propose two assessment parameters corre-
sponding to these two aspects. Figure 3 shows an example of a simple argument:
goal A is supported by two sub-goals B and C; the assessment parameters are
annotated on this GSN argument and interpreted in the following way:
wB
wC
A
B C
(belB, uncerB, disbB) (belC, uncerC, disbC)
wB
(belA, uncerA, disbA)
Fig. 3. An example of simple argument annotated with assessment parameters
– A 3-tuple (bel,uncer,disb), such as (belA, uncerA, disbA) (see the definition
in Equation (1)) represents the trustworthiness of a claim. They do not only
assess the confidence in the claims, but also allow our degree of distrust and
uncertainty in them to be explicitly expressed.
– wB and wC are the disjoint contributing weights of B and C, wB , wC ∈ [0, 1]
and wB + wC ≤ 1. A disjoint contributing weight means the degree that B
or C can independently contribute to the trustworthiness in A. It refers to
the appropriateness of sub-goals.
In order to propagate the trustworthiness estimation from B and C nodes to
A, we propose two argument types:
– Dependent argument (D-Arg): When the contribution (to the trustworthi-
ness in A) of a sub-goal B depends on the trustworthiness in another sub-
goal C, the argument B+C→A is called dependent argument. For example,
an argument is “B: Test process is correct” and “C: Test results are cor-
rect” support “A: System is acceptably safe”. The contribution of C to the
trustworthiness in A depends on the trustworthiness in B.
– Redundant argument (R-Arg): When sub-goals belonging to the same top
goal have a certain degree of overlapping to contribute to the trustworthiness
in the top goal, the argument is called redundant argument. For example, an
argument is “B: Formal verification is passed” and “C: Test is conclusive”
support “A: System is acceptably safe”. B and C are two different techniques
to assure the system safety. Either of them can support A in certain degree
without depending on the other one.
Based on these two argument types, we proposed in [19] the aggregation
formulas to integrate the trustworthiness of sub-goals. The related formulas are
presented as Equations (II) and (IV) in Table 1 for the dependent and redundant
arguments, respectively. In this calculation, we introduce a factor to represent
the degree of dependency and redundancy among sub-goals. For an argument
such as B and C support A, this factor, representing the degree of correspondence
of sub-goals B and C, is expressed as: cA = 1−wB−wC , where cA ∈ [0, 1]. While
cA varies between 0 and 1, the two formulas (II) and (IV) lead to several special
cases of argument types, which are also described in Table 1. In particular:
– Fully dependent argument (FD-Arg): For a dependent argument, when cA =
1, i.e. wB = wC = 0, the argument is a fully dependent argument. B have a
total interdependence on C. One sub-goals cannot contribute to the trust-
worthiness in A without the other one.
– Fully redundant argument (FR-Arg): For a redundant argument, when cA =
1, i.e. wB = wC = 0, the argument is fully redundant argument. Either of B
and C can contribute to the full trustworthiness in the top goal.
– Disparate argument (I-Arg): When the correspondence between B and C
cA decreases (i.e. wB , wA increase) to cA = 0 (i.e. wB + wC = 1), the
aggregation formulas of the dependent and redundant arguments become
the same formulas ((III) in Table 1). B and C contribute independently to
only one part of the trustworthiness in the top goal.
Except the above three special argument types, other arguments are either
partial dependent argument (PD-Arg) or partial redundant argument (PR-Arg).
Table 1. Comparison of two different argument typesTable 2. Comparison of two di↵erent argument types
Arg. types cA wB ,wC Aggregation formula
D-Arg
FD-Arg 1 0
belA = belBbelC (I)
disbA = disbB + disbC   disbBdisbC
PD-Arg # # belA = belBwB + belCwC + belBbelCcA (II)
disbA = disbBwB + disbCwC + (disbB + disbC   disbBdisbC)cA
I-Arg 0
P
= 1
belA = belBwB + belCwC (III)
R-Arg
disbA = disbCwB + disbCwC
PR-Arg " " belA = belBwB + belCwC + [1   (1   belB)(1   belC)]cA (IV)
disbA = disbBwB + disbCwC + disbBdisbCcA
FR-Arg 1 0
belA = 1   (1   belB)(1   belC) (V)
disbA = disbBdisbC
3.3 Expert Judgment Extraction
While assessing an argument, an assessor has to evaluate all the elements of
this argument, i.e. statement, evidence, context, etc. In Figure 4 a), a goal G1:
“Low-level requirements coverage is achieved” is to be assessed. It is supported
by the evidence S1: “Low-level requirement coverage verification reports”, which
records the coverage verification of low-level requirements based on the contexts
C1: “Complete low-level requirements” and C2: “Structural coverage analysis
(statement coverage, branch coverage, etc) reports”. We adopt an evaluation
matrix as proposed by [8] to assess G1 by two criteria: the decision on the goal
and the confidence in the decision (dec, conf). In Figure 4 b), there are 4 levels
for decision scale from “rejectable” to “acceptable” and 6 levels for Confidence
Scale from “lack of confidence” to “for sure”. We assume that, in both scales, the
levels are evenly and linearly distributed. A solid dot represents the evaluation
of this goal by an assessor. Here, the assessor accepts this goal with very high
confidence. The decision “acceptable” indicates that the assessor believes that
all the low-level requirements were actually covered. Moreover, the “very high
confidence” comes from relatively high coverage rate and thorough explanation
of discrepancies in evidence S1.
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Fig. 4. An evaluation matrix for safety argument
2.2 Dempster-Shafer Theory
Among uncertainty theories (such as probabilistic approaches, possibility theory,
fuzzy set, etc.), Dempster-Shafer (D-S) Theory or evidence theory, was developed
by Arthur Dempster and Glenn Shafer successively [19]. This theory o↵ers a
powerful tool to model human belief in evidence from di↵erent sources, and
an explicit modeling of epistemic uncertainties, which is not the case in other
theories. As presented later, we propose to use the D-S Theory as it allows
uncertainty, imprecision or ignorance, i.e., “w know that we don’t know” to be
explicitly expressed.
Let X be a variable taking values in a finite set ⌦ representing a frame of
discer ment. ⌦ is composed of all the possible situations of interest. I this paper,
we consider only binary frame of discernment, i.e. ⌦X = {X̄, X}. For instance,
if X would be the state of a bulb, then ⌦ = {on, off}. The mass function on
⌦ (m⌦) is the mapping of the power set of ⌦ on the closed interval [0,1] that
is, 2⌦ ! [0, 1]. The ass m⌦(P ) reflects the degree of belief committed to the
hypothesis that the truth lies in P . The sum of the masses of all elements in the
power set is equal to one. For instance, we can have the following assignment
of belief: m1({on}) = 0.5, m1({o↵}) = 0.3, m1({on, o↵}) = 0.2. Note that
m1({on, o↵}) does not represent the belief that the bulb might be in {on} or
{o↵} state, but the degree of belief in the statement “we don’t know”.
More generally, an opinion about a statement X is assessed with 3 masses:
belief (belX = m(X)), disbelief (disbX = m(X̄)), and the uncertainty (uncerX =
m(⌦)). This leads to m(X)+m(X̄)+m(⌦) = 1 (belief + disbelief + uncertainty
= 1 ). Thus we have:
8
<
:
belX = m(X) represents the belief
disbX = m(X̄) represents the disbelief
uncerX = m(⌦) = 1   belX   disbX represents the uncertainty
(1)
where belX , disbX and uncerX 2 [0, 1].
3 Safety Argument Assessment Framework
In this section, we introduce an assessment framework for safety argument, which
allows 1) assessors to provide their opinions on the claims of lowest level of struc-
tured safety argument based on available evidence (e.g. test reports, verification
reports, etc.); and 2) to aggregate the e opinions hierarchic lly until that we
obtain the opinion on the top claim of the argument. The opinion aggregation
adopts a quantitative assessment method of argument confidence proposed in
our previous works [20]. A new formula to calculate the degree of disbelief and
uncertainty is provided in this paper.
3.1 Framework Overview
The proposed assessment fram work for safety argument is summariz d in Figure
2 with an argument showing that Goal B and Goal C support Goal A. This
schema also illustrates the three main steps:
2.2 Dempster-Shafer Theory
Among uncertainty theories (s ch as probabilistic appr aches, possibility theory,
fuzzy set, etc.), Dempster-Shafer (D-S) Theory or evidence theory, was developed
by Arthur Dempst r a d Glenn Shafer succ ssively [19]. This theory o↵e s a
powerful tool to model human belief in evidence from di↵erent sources, and
an explicit modeling of epistemic uncertainties, which is not the case in other
theories. As presented later, we propose to use the D-S Theory as it allows
uncertainty, impre ision or ignorance, i.e., “we know that we don’t know” to be
explicitly expressed.
Let X be a variable taking values in a finite set ⌦ representing a frame of
discernment. ⌦ is composed of all the possible situations of interest. I this pape ,
we consider only binary frame of discernment, i.e. ⌦X = {X̄, X}. For instance,
if X would be the state of a bulb, then ⌦ = {on, off}. The mass function on
⌦ (m⌦) is the mapping of the power set of ⌦ on the closed interval [0,1] that
is, 2⌦ ! [0, ]. The mass m⌦(P ) reflects the degree of belief committed to the
hypothesis that the ruth lies in P . The sum of the m sses of all elements in the
power set is equal to one. For instance, we can have the following assignment
of belief: m1({on}) = 0.5, m1({o↵}) = 0.3, m1({on, o↵}) = 0.2. Note that
m1({on, o↵}) does not represent the belief that the bulb might be in {on} or
{o↵} state, but the degree of belief in the statement “we don’t know”.
More generally, an opinion about a statement X is assessed with 3 masses:
belief (belX = m(X)), disbelief (disbX = m(X̄)), and the uncertainty (uncerX =
m(⌦)). This leads to m(X)+m(X̄)+m(⌦) = 1 (belief disbeli f + uncertainty
= 1 ). Thus we have:
8
<
:
belX = m(X) represents the belief
disbX = m(X̄) represents the disbelief
uncerX = m(⌦) = 1   belX   disbX represents the uncertainty
(1)
where belX , disbX and uncerX 2 [0, 1].
3 Safety Argument Assessment Framework
In this section, we introduce an assessment framework for safety argument, which
allows 1) assessors to provide their opinions on the claims of lowest level of struc-
tured safety argument based on available evidence (e.g. test reports, verification
reports, etc.); and 2) to aggregate these opinions hierarchically until that we
obtain the opinion on th top claim of he argument. The opinion aggregation
adopts a quantitative assessment method of argument confidence proposed in
our previous rks [20]. A new formula to calculate the degree of disbelief and
uncertainty is provided in this paper.
3.1 Framework Overview
The proposed assessment framework for safety argument is summarized in Figure
2 with an argument showing hat Goal B nd Goal C supp t Goal A. This
schema also illustrates the three main steps:
Due to the li ited space of this paper, the parameter formalization and the
development process of assessment aggregation formulas are not presented. For
more details and a general assessment model for N-sub-goal arguments, please
refer to paper [19]. In Tabl 1, we directly provide the formulas to calculate
(belA, unc rA, disbA) according to the argument types.
3.3 Expert Judgment Extraction
While assessing an argument, a safety expert has to evaluate all the elements of
this argument, i.e. statement, evidence, context, etc. In Figure 4 a), a goal G1:
“Low-level requirements coverage is achieved” is to be assessed. It is supported
by the evidence S1: “Low-level requirement coverage verification reports”, which
records the coverage verification of low-level requirements based on the contexts
C1: “Complete low-level requirements” and C2: “Structural coverage analysis
(statement coverage, branch coverage, etc) reports”. We adopt an evaluation
matrix as proposed by [7] to assess G1 by two criteria: the decision on the goal
and the confidence in the decision (dec, conf). In Figure 4 b), there are 4 levels
for decision scale from “rejectable” to “acceptable” and 6 levels for Confidence
Scale from “lack of confidence” to “for sure”. We assume that, in both scales, the
levels are evenly and linearly distributed. A solid dot represents the evaluation
of this goal by an expert. Here, the expert accepts this goal with very high
confidence. The decision “acceptable” indicates that the expert believes that
all the low-level requirements were actually covered. Moreover, the “very high
confidence” comes from relatively high coverage rate and thorough explanation
of discrepancies in evidence S1.
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Fig. 4. An evaluation matrix for safety argument
In order to further assess the upper-level goals, we need to aggregate the
expert’s evaluation of sub-goals. As mentioned in the Section 3.1, the evaluation
of the experts (dec, conf) will be transformed to belief, uncertainty and disbe-
lief. In fact, this step is used to formalize the evaluation as a mass function in
order to take advantage of the D-S Theory to combine uncertain information.
This uncertainty theory offers a powerful tool to explicitly model and process
information with uncertainty. We adopt the definition of decision and confidence
in the decision of any claim A based on belief functions proposed in [7] to fit
the input of the aggregation model (refer to Table 1). The modified definition is
presented in Equations (2) and (3).
confA = belA + disbA (2)
{
decA = belA/(belA + disbA), belA + disbA 6= 0
decA = 0, belA + disbA = 0
(3)
Due to the constrains of mass function of D-S Theory, we can deduce that confA,
decA ∈ [0, 1].
Once, the (decA, confA) is obtained based on (belA, uncerA, disbA), their
values may not be exactly one of the values of 4 decision levels and 6 confidence
levels. If so, these numbers should be rounded to find the nearest levels.
Furthermore, the inverse functions from (dec, conf)A to (belA, uncerA, disbA)
are given in the Equation 4.



belA = confA ∗ decA
disbA = confA ∗ (1− decA)
uncerA = 1− bA − dA
(4)
3.4 Application Example
In this subsection, we use a fragment of GSN argument shown in Figure 5 as an
example to present the use of the proposed safety case assessment framework.
In this GSN model, it is assumed that “G1: system is acceptably safe” (claim
A), if “G2: Low-level requirements coverage is achieved ” (sub-goal B) and “G3:
High-level requirements coverage is achieved ” (sub-goal C) are fulfilled. The
confidence in A is based on the assessment of sub-goals B and C. To illustrate the
calculus, we provide the arbitrary values to assess B as “opposable” (weak reject)
with “very low confidence” and C as “acceptable” with “very high confidence”.
The low-level requirements coverage is verified through the structural coverage
analysis based on functional testing; the high-level requirements coverage is also
based on function testing. B and C are linked to each other, but they also cover
two different aspects. Thus, they are considered as partial dependent arguments.
We arbitrarily choose the values cA = 0.5 and equal disjoint contributing weights
wB = wC = (1 − cA)/2 = 0.25. A possible approach is presented in Section 4
to extract the information about argument types and weights with the help of
a survey.
Here follows the three-step process of the framework proposed in Section 3.1
to realize the assessment of confidence in A.
– Transforming the evaluation (dec, conf) of B and C to (bel, uncer, disb) using
Equation 4. (belB , uncerB , disbB) = (0.066, 0.8, 0.134), (belC , uncerC , disbC)
= (0.8, 0.2, 0.0)
– Aggregating the estimations of B and C with the aggregation formula of
dependent argument (refer to (II) in Table 1). (belA, uncerA, disbA) = (0.243,
0.657, 0.101)
– Calculating the decision on A and the confidence in the decision (decA, confA)
= (0.707, 0.343). The level of decision and confidence in this decision are se-
lected by the nearest value of the results. Thus, goal A is “tolerable”, “with
low confidence”.
In brief, the framework can be regarded as a function f : (decA, confA) =
f [(decB , confB), (decC , confC)], where inputs are the evaluation of sub-goals B
and C, the output is the assessment of the top goal A. More generally, this
framework can be applied for a safety argument with multiple sub-goals and
more hierarchical levels, thanks to the general version of aggregation formulas.
wCwB
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Fig. 5. A safety argument example to be estimated
4 A Survey for Expert Data Collection
To study the argument properties, such as the argument types and the sub-goal
weights, we carried out a survey among experts in system safety domain.
4.1 Implementation of the Survey
In the questionnaire, four argument fragments are provided. These arguments
includes Arg1 represented in Figure 5 and Arg2-Arg4 in Figures 6. They have the
same form with an identical top goal A and two sub-goals B and C. For each ar-
gument, two pairs of estimation results of B and C (corresponding to Q1 and Q2
in Table 2) are initial information given to the respondents. Then, they are asked
to make a decision on the top goals, that is, choosing an appropriate decision
level among rejectable (rej), opposable (opp), tolerable (tol), acceptable (acc);
and select their confidence level in this decision from 1-lack of confidence to 6-
for sure. For better understanding of the assessment process, an introduction of
the evaluation matrix is given at the beginning of the questionnaire; and expla-
nations and assumptions of the 4 arguments are also provided. Furthermore, an
extra question follows each argument asking respondents for their understanding
degree of the argument. The degrees are “to great extent”, “somewhat”, “very
little” and “not at all”. An online version of this questionnaire is available [1].
B
The minor hazard has 
been addressed
C
The critical hazard 
has been addressed
A
System is acceptably 
safe
B
Test process is 
correct
C
Test results are 
correct
A
System is acceptably 
safe
B
Formal verification 
is passed
C
Test is 
conclusive
Arg3
A
System is acceptably 
safe
2 hazards have 
been identified.
Context
Arg4Arg2
Fig. 6. Argument fragments questioned in the survey
35 experts answered this questionnaire, including: 18 system safety engineers,
safety managers and other engineers of critical system fields, and 17 researchers
and PhD candidates working in the system dependability domain. Due to no
significant difference in the analysis results between the respondent’s profiles,
their answers are processed together.
4.2 Result Analysis
The case study aims to analyze the properties of the argument examples from the
questionnaire responses, that is, to estimate the sub-goal weights and argument
types implicitly considered by the experts . The collected data (expert data) are
compared with the data calculated based on the assessment formulas introduced
in Section 3 (theoretical data).
In Figure 7, the theoretical data of dependent argument is shown as a cloud
of dots derived from random trials of possible values of wB and wC . Note that
the triangles will be explained later. Different shapes of clouds are due to the
two pairs of inputs of B and C for questions Q1(Figure 7 a)) and Q2 (Figure 7
b)). According to the process of the assessment framework, we calculate the
values of (decA, confA) from (decB , confB) and (decC , confC) . Then we plot
the values in the evaluation matrix. The solid dots represent the values with the
constraint that wB > wC ; whereas the crosses represent the values of wB ≤ wC .
In the figures, the “F” letters represent the output of a special case of dependent
argument: fully dependent argument.
Then, in order to extract the consensus of experts, we filtered the data using
the confidence intervals. Also, if the respondents chose “not at all” for the un-
derstanding of one argument, the answers for the corresponding two questions
were removed. The expert data are presented with triangles in the evaluation
matrix (Figure 7). The size of the triangle indicates the number of respondents
giving the same opinion.
Finally, the expert data are compared with the theoretical data clouds. Tak-
ing question Q1 of the argument Arg1 for example, we consider this argument
as dependent argument, since there is some dependency between the two sub-
goals. Hence, in Figure 7, the expert data are compared with framework output
of dependent argument. Two large dots are matched with the distribution of
dependent graphs. We assume that the argument type can be validated by the
Q1 Q2
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 5 − very high conf.
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Fig. 7. Experts estimations of Argument 1 and theoretical data of dependent argument
degree of overlapping of these two sets of data. Thus, the percentage of the
answers positioned in the cloud (matched answers) is calculated (see Table 2).
Large percentages of overlapping for both of figures a) and b) confirm that the
Arg1 is a dependent argument.
Furthermore, some weight information of B and C can be deduced. Look-
ing at the biggest triangle in Figure 7 a), it shows that 8 experts have given
the opposable decision with very high confidence (denoted as opp-5 ). Compared
with the theoretical data cloud, these 8 answers indicate that the argument can
be either fully dependent argument with wB = wC = 0 or partial dependent
argument with wB > wC .
Table 2. Validation of safety argument assessment approach
Validation
Validated 
arg. types
Answer in 
cloud (%) Weight info.
Q1 B: opp-5 C: acc-5 A: opp-5, tol-5 65.0% wB≥wC
Q2 B: opp-5 C: acc-2 A: rej-5, opp-3,4,5 63.6% -
Q1 B: opp-5 C: acc-5 A: opp-5, tol-5 72.2% wB≥wC
Q2 B: opp-5 C: acc-2 A: opp-4,5 62.5% wB>wC
Q1 B: opp-5 C: acc-5 A: opp-5, tol-5 62.5% wB≥wC
Q2 B: opp-5 C: acc-2 A: rej-5, opp-5 58.3% wB>wC
Q1 B: opp-5 C: acc-5 A: tol-4,5 57.7% wB=wC
Q2 B: opp-5 C: acc-2 A: opp-3, opp-5 77.8% -
PD-Arg.
Arg2
Arg3
Arg4
PR-Arg.
I-Arg.
PD-Arg.
Arg1
PD-Arg.
PR-Arg.
PD-Arg.PD-Arg.
Arg. Ques. Initial values Expert answer     examples
Expected 
arg. types
In Table 2, the analysis of the expert answers for 4 arguments is summed
up. Some representative examples of the expert answers are given in this table.
Comparing the “expected argument types” with “validated argument types”,
Arg4 is considered as “partial dependent argument” rather than the “disparate
argument”. The percentages of the answers in the cloud are calculated for all
the argument examples. These results show that experts have a certain degree
of consensus on the type of the arguments based on our approach. Moreover,
the experts’ preference of weights for B and C are listed in the last column. “-”
means that there is no clear opinion on the preference of weights.
A large percentage of the consensus answers matches the model output of
the assessment framework proposed in this paper, which is a first validation of
the framework. Furthermore, based on the above analysis of the survey data, we
deduce the properties of the 4 argument examples including argument types and
the disjoint contributing weights.
5 Related Work
Confidence assessment of safety case has been mainly addressed with two per-
spectives. The first one focuses on the identification of “defeaters” of an argu-
ment, and the construction of an additional argument dedicated to confidence
[3, 12]. Such approaches are mainly qualitative. A second trend is the develop-
ment of quantitative approaches of confidence in argument. Indeed, excessive
growth of argument leads it to make analysis for estimating confidence too com-
plex; then quantitative tools might help analysts to estimate the confidence.
To refer to some of them, we can cite [8], based on Bayesian Network, and [7,
11] based on belief function theory. As presented in [10], many approaches are
studied for quantitative assessment of safety argument confidence. In this last
paper the authors study the flaws and counterarguments for each approaches,
and conclude that whereas quantitative approaches for confidence assessment
are of high interest, no method is currently fully applicable. Moreover, we argue
that these quantitative approaches lack of practicability between assurance case
and confidence assessment, or do not provide clear interpretation of confidence
calculation parameters. Our framework over comes this flaw.
Compared to our approach, the paper [17] provides an expert judgment ex-
traction of confidence and a propagation calculation based on belief theory in
order to build a confidence case as proposed in [12]. Nevertheless they do not ad-
dress inference type when aggregating information. They also do not study how
the confidence level could be used by the analysts to make a decision regarding
the safety case.
In [2], the authors mainly introduce four argument types and formulas to
combine confidence regarding these types. They also use belief theory for calcu-
lation, and the result is provided with belief, disbelief and uncertainty estimation
for each evidence of the safety case. Even if some types of argument are compa-
rable with our proposal (e.g., their “Alternative” is near our “Redundant”), they
do not provide any justification of the combining formulas, with a relative low
intuitive interpretation of the parameters (which is a main drawback for poten-
tial users). Moreover, once calculation is performed, the results do not provide
any justification for a decision regarding the acceptability of the safety case.
As already mentioned, we reuse a part of the approach presented in [7]. In
this paper, the authors introduce a way to convert a decision on the acceptability
of a statement in a safety case and its confidence, into belief theory parameters.
We also use similar steps in our approach, from expert judgment extraction to
calculation of a decision and its confidence in the top statement. Compared to
our work, they did not use GSN for safety case modeling as we proposed; but
the main difference is in the argument types and associated formulas. Indeed,
they extended the work from [9] to propose 6 types of arguments. We found
them too complex for an intuitive identification in a real safety case. Moreover,
according to each of these types, several parameters are difficult to determine and
interpret. Our objective is really to provide an efficient and pragmatic approach
for analysts; thus we actually only propose 2 types of argument, and a direct
application to GSN safety cases.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, an assessment framework has been put forward to support the
safety argument assessment process. This 3-step framework only requires the
evaluation results of the lowest-level claims; then it aggregates them to estimate
the confidence in the top claim. The quantitative aggregation approach based
on Dempster-Shafer theory was proposed in our previous work [19]. An eval-
uation matrix for extracting experts opinion is adopted [7] with the scales of
decision and confidence in the decision. We define two main argument types:
dependent and redundant arguments. By changing the weights of sub-goals, we
also proposed to refine these types using the same formula. Meanwhile a possible
approach to estimate argument properties is introduced. A survey was carried
out to make a preliminary validation of our framework. We focus in this survey
on validating the types of arguments, their aggregation models and the expert
judgment extraction. 35 safety engineers and researchers in system dependable
domain participated to this survey. We compared the questionnaire results with
the theoretical output calculated by applying our assessment framework. This
first experiment shows that our aggregation models are consistent with expert
judgments. The framework makes practical the theoretical model in terms of
the extraction of experts’ opinion on the trustworthiness of sub-goals. However,
while assessing an argument, this framework still requires the expert to deter-
mine the argument types and weights of sub-goals. A method to identify the
argument types and weights for a given safety argument will be our future work.
References
1. Questionnaire for safety argument assessment research, 1 2017.
https://goo.gl/forms/V3vMnl59cTWA6Lws2.
2. Anaheed Ayoub, Jian Chang, Oleg Sokolsky, and Insup Lee. Assessing the over-
all sufficiency of safety arguments. In 21st Safety-Critical Systems Symposium
(SSS’13), pages 127–144, 2013.
3. Anaheed Ayoub, BaekGyu Kim, Insup Lee, and Oleg Sokolsky. A systematic ap-
proach to justifying sufficient confidence in software safety arguments. In Computer
Safety, Reliability, and Security, pages 305–316. Springer, 2012.
4. Peter Bishop and Robin Bloomfield. A methodology for safety case development. In
Industrial Perspectives of Safety-Critical Systems, pages 194–203. Springer, 1998.
5. Robin Bloomfield, Bev Littlewood, and David Wright. Confidence: its role in
dependability cases for risk assessment. In Dependable Systems and Networks,
2007. DSN’07. 37th Annual IEEE/IFIP International Conference on, pages 338–
346. IEEE, 2007.
6. Lukasz Cyra and Janusz Gorski. Supporting compliance with security standards
by trust case templates. In Dependability of Computer Systems, 2007. DepCoS-
RELCOMEX’07. 2nd International Conference on, pages 91–98. IEEE, 2007.
7. Lukasz Cyra and Janusz Gorski. Support for argument structures review and
assessment. Reliability Engineering & System Safety, 96(1):26–37, 2011.
8. Ewen Denney, Ganesh Pai, and Ibrahim Habli. Towards measurement of confidence
in safety cases. In Empirical Software Engineering and Measurement (ESEM), 2011
International Symposium on, pages 380–383. IEEE, 2011.
9. Trudy Govier. A practical study of argument. Wadsworth, Cengage Learning, 2013.
10. Patrick J. Graydon and C. Michael Holloway. An investigation of proposed tech-
niques for quantifying confidence in assurance arguments. Safety Science, 92:53 –
65, 2017.
11. Jérémie Guiochet, Quynh Anh Do Hoang, and Mohamed Kaaniche. A model for
safety case confidence assessment. In Computer Safety, Reliability, and Security
(SAFECOMP), pages 313–327. Springer, 2015.
12. Richard Hawkins, Tim Kelly, John Knight, and Patrick Graydon. A new approach
to creating clear safety arguments. In Advances in systems safety, pages 3–23.
Springer, 2011.
13. ISO/IEC 15026-2. Systems and software engineering - systems and software assur-
ance - part 2: Assurance case, 2011. International Organization for Standardization
(ISO)/International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC).
14. Audun Jøsang. A logic for uncertain probabilities. International Journal of Un-
certainty, Fuzziness and Knowledge-Based Systems, 9(03):279–311, 2001.
15. Tim Kelly. Arguing Safety - A Systematic Approach to Safety Case Management.
PhD thesis, Department of Computer Science, University of York, 1998.
16. Tim Kelly and John McDermid. Safety case construction and reuse using pat-
terns. In Computer Safety, Reliability, and Security (SAFECOMP), pages 55–69.
Springer, 1997.
17. S. Nair, N. Walkinshaw, T. Kelly, and J. L. de la Vara. An evidential reasoning
approach for assessing confidence in safety evidence. In 2015 IEEE 26th Inter-
national Symposium on Software Reliability Engineering (ISSRE), pages 541–552,
Nov 2015.
18. Glenn Shafer. A mathematical theory of evidence, volume 1. Princeton university
press Princeton, 1976.
19. Rui Wang, Jérémie Guiochet, Gilles Motet, and Walter Schön. DS theory for
argument confidence assessment. In International Conference on Belief Functions,
pages 190–200. Springer, 2016.
